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Abstract—In this era of machine learning models, their func-
tionality is being threatened by adversarial attacks. In the face
of this struggle for making artificial neural networks robust,
finding a model, resilient to these attacks, is very important. In
this work, we present, for the first time, a comprehensive analysis
of the behavior of more bio-plausible networks, namely Spiking
Neural Network (SNN) under state-of-the-art adversarial tests.
We perform a comparative study of the accuracy degradation
between conventional VGG-9 Artificial Neural Network (ANN)
and equivalent spiking network with CIFAR-10 dataset in both
whitebox and blackbox setting for different types of single-step
and multi-step FGSM (Fast Gradient Sign Method) attacks. We
demonstrate that SNNs tend to show more resiliency compared to
ANN under blackbox attack scenario. Additionally, we find that
SNN robustness is largely dependent on the corresponding train-
ing mechanism. We observe that SNNs trained by spike-based
backpropagation are more adversarially robust than the ones
obtained by ANN-to-SNN conversion rules in several whitebox
and blackbox scenarios. Finally, we also propose a simple, yet,
effective framework for crafting adversarial attacks from SNNs.
Our results suggest that attacks crafted from SNNs following
our proposed method are much stronger than those crafted from
ANNs.
Index Terms—Adversarial attack, Spiking Neural Network,
Artificial Neural Network, Blackbox attack, Whitebox attack.
I. INTRODUCTION
Contemporary machine learning models like Artificial Neu-
ral Networks (ANN) have completed several milestones to-
wards gaining super-human performance in visual recognition
tasks like image classification, text and voice recognition [1],
[2] etc. Application of such networks is being considered
for autonomous cars, drones and robotics. For such mission
critical applications, there is an urgent need to improve the
robustness of networks against adversarial attacks. Adversarial
attacks [3], [4] can be generated by injecting carefully-crafted
perturbations to a clean input so that it can deceive the model
into producing incorrect outputs with high probability. Note,
the perturbation is small enough to be perceptible to the human
eye. This vulnerability holds even when the adversarial input is
generated from a different trained model other than the target
This work was supported in part by C-BRIC, one of six centers in JUMP, a
Semiconductor Research Corporation (SRC) program sponsored by DARPA.
[5]. The profound implication of the problem has triggered
research interest towards addressing this issue and finding
ways to defend against adversarial attacks in the context of
state-of-the-art neural network models.
Research in [3], [4], [6], [7] shows the vulnerability of deep
ANNs against adversaries. Several adversarial training and
defense mechanisms have been proposed in this regard, like
ensemble training [8], implicit prior modeling with random
noise [9], scalable training [10] etc. However, one fundamental
question that remains unanswered is whether there are any
network models inherently resistant to adversarial attacks. In
the face of this question, more biologically plausible neural
network model, like Spiking Neural Network (SNN) comes
into picture. In an SNN, the network receives stochastic
stimulation from noisy neurons in the form of Poisson spike
train, leading to the temporal evolution of the membrane
potential of the neurons [11]. This inherent noise embedded
in an SNN makes it worthwhile to investigate how the spiking
network reacts under adversarial attacks, compared to ANNs.
In this paper, we have analyzed the behavior of large-scale
spiking neural networks against state-of-the-art adversarial
attacks. Our experiment is focused on VGG-9 network models
with CIFAR-10 dataset. To the best of our knowledge, this
is the first work to analyse the characteristics of a spiking
network under different kinds of adversarial attacks. The key
contributions can be summarized as follows:
• Spiking Neural Network model is a comparatively newer
addition to the machine learning family. Although there
exists significant amount of literature on the technique
of crafting adversarial input from ANN, there is none
to generate SNN-crafted adversary. We propose a simple
mechanism to generate adversarial inputs from SNN
model parameters without the need of any non-trivial
gradient calculation in the spiking domain.
• We present comprehensive quantitative comparison of the
behavior of ANN and equivalent SNN under different
attack scenarios. We observe that spiking networks are
more robust than rate-based ANNs for blackbox attacks
(i.e. when attacker has no knowledge of the target model’s
parameters). In whitebox attack (i.e. when attacker has
full knowledge of the target model’s parameters), SNNs,
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generally, yield higher accuracy degradation than ANNs.
Furthermore, our results suggest that attacks crafted from
SNNs following our proposed method are much stronger
than those crafted from ANNs.
• We demonstrate that the adversarial resistance of SNNs
varies depending on the training mechanism. We have
considered two different training methods: ANN-to-SNN
conversion [12], [13] and direct spike-based backpropa-
gation [14], [15] in our experiments. We observe that the
latter method shows better resistivity under whitebox and
blackbox scenarios.
The organization of the rest of the paper starts with
illustration of the basic concepts of the adversarial attacks
and Spiking Neural Network (SNN) in section II and III,
respectively. In the next section (section IV), we explain
the network architecture, training methods, adversarial input
generation and testing process. Section V contains our
simulation and analysis results, followed by conclusion in
section VI.
II. ADVERSARIAL ATTACK: FUNDAMENTALS
Given a classification model h with dataset (x, ytrue),
where x is the clean image and ytrue is the corresponding
correct label, the main concept of adversarial attack is to
find an input xadv such that x and xadv are indistinguishable
to the human eye, yet the model misclassifies xadv , i.e.
produces high probability on wrong labels. In our work,
we have considered the following approaches to generate xadv .
A. Non-targeted FGSM (Fast Gradient Sign Method)
This is the most basic and widely used approach to generate
adversarial perturbations in the following form [4]
xadv = x+ sign(∇xJ(x, ytrue)) (1)
Here  refers to the amount of perturbation. Usually, the value
of  is much smaller than the unperturbed data x. J(x, ytrue)
is the loss function of the model. ∇xJ is the gradient of the
loss function with respect to the original clean data.
B. Non-targeted R-FGSM (Random-step FGSM)
In this method, the single step gradient calculation is
preceded by a simple step of adding small random noise
(N(Od, Id)) to the image beforehand.
x′ = x+ αsign(N(Od, Id)), (2)
xadv = x′ + (− α)sign(∇x′J(x′, ytrue)) (3)
Here, initial perturbation α < . Authors in [8] introduced
this method to escape the non-smooth vicinity of the data
point.
C. I-FGSM (Iterative FGSM)
This is a multistep method for generating adversarial
inputs. It iteratively applies FGSM with step-size α ≥ /k,
where k denotes the number of iterations [8]. In non-targeted
I-FGSM, the loss is calculated with respect to the true label
ytrue, whereas targeted I-FGSM uses either a random class,
yrandom or the least likely class, yll for calculating loss
function and perturbs the input in the opposite direction as
the gradient.
1) Non-targeted I-FGSM:
x0
adv = x, (4)
xN+1
adv = Clipx,{xNadv + αsign(∇xJ(xNadv, ytrue))}
(5)
2) Targeted I-FGSM:
x0
adv = x, (6)
xN+1
adv = Clipx,{xNadv−αsign(∇xJ(xNadv, yll))} (7)
xN
adv is the adversarial sample at N th iteration. ytrue
and yll are the correct and the least-likely class label,
respectively. α is the perturbation per step. Clipx,() denotes
element-wise clipping of the argument to the range [x−, x+]
III. SPIKING NEURAL NETWORK: FUNDAMENTALS
Spiking Neural Networks (SNN) operate based on bio-
plausible event-driven algorithm. From network topology per-
spective, the activation blocks (like Rectified Linear Unit) of
the ANN is replaced by biological neuron-based functional
blocks (e.g. Integrate and Fire (IF) neuron, Leaky Integrate
and Fire (LIF) neuron) in the equivalent SNN. The dynamics
of LIF spiking neuron is formulated as follows:
τ
dVmem
dt
= −Vmem + wθ(t− tk) (8)
Vmem is the membrane potential of the neurons, τ is the
time constant for the decay of Vmem, w is the synaptic
weight and θ(t − tk) represents the spike at time instant
tk. There are mainly two broad categories for training an
SNN: unsupervised and supervised. However, in this work,
we have used two of the supervised training strategies
in order to achieve high accuracy. A brief illustration of
these two techniques are presented in the next two subsections.
A. ANN to SNN conversion (SNN-I)
ANN to SNN conversion method considers a simple
Integrate and Fire neuron (IF) as the neuron activation
function due to its functional resemblance to Rectified Linear
Unit (ReLU), without any leak or refractory period. Several
authors [12], [13] have proposed techniques of adjusting
the synaptic weights (’weight normalization’) or neuronal
threshold values (’threshold balancing’) to acquire lossless
transformation from ANN to SNN. The accuracy reported for
SNNs, trained in this way, is high, compared to ANN, even
for very large scale networks.
B. Spike-based training (SNN-II)
In this method, SNN is directly trained based on an event-
driven supervised gradient descent backpropagation algorithm.
Unlike the conversion mechanism, LIF neurons are used as the
basic building block here. In forward propagation, Poisson-
distributed spike train, generated from the input pixels, are
fed to the network. Accumulated weighted spikes at the input
of a neuron, at time t, triggers an output spike, if it exceeds
a threshold value. Neurons at each layer undergo this process
based on the input spikes received from the preceding layer. In
order to carry out backpropagation in the spiking domain, we
need a differentiable transfer function for the neurons. To that
effect, the activation of the spiking neuron is formulated by
low-pass filtering the spike train, according to the following
equation.
Activation, a(t) =
1
T
t∑
k=1
exp(− t− tk
τ
) (9)
The time constant τ dictates the decay rate of the neuron
activation. T is the total time. tk refers to the time instant
of the k-th spike. During the backpropagation process, the
gradient of error with respect to weight requires calculating
the derivative of the neuron activation a with respect to the net
input to the neurons, which is approximated by the following
equation:
δa
δnet
=
1
Vth
(1 +
δa
δt
) (10)
where Vth refers to the threshold value of the neuron, net
is the accumulated weighted sum of spikes at the input
of a neuron, and t is the time instant. The details of the
backpropagation algorithm is illustrated in [14], [15].
IV. EXPERIMENTS
A. Dataset and network topology
Our experiments mainly focus on the standard visual
recognition dataset CIFAR-10 with VGG-9 networks. The
VGG-9 architecture is 32×32-64c5-64c5-2s-128c5-128c5-2s-
256c5-256c5-256c5-2s-1024fc-10o, where c = convolutional
layer, s = sub-sampling layer, fc = fully connected layer
and o = output layer. The input image in CIFAR-10 dataset
results in 3-channel 32×32 input neurons, followed by
2 subsequent layers of 64 convolutional kernels of size
5×5 each, followed by 2×2 spatial averaging sub-sampling
window. This convolution process is repeated in the second
and the third stage with 128 and 256 maps of convolutional
kernels, respectively. Note that the third stage has 3
convolutional layers. The final two stages of the networks
are fully connected layers. The outputs from the third stage
sub-sampling is vectorized and fed into a fully connected
layer with 1024 outputs. The final layer consists of 10 output
neurons corresponding to the 10 classes of CIFAR-10. It
TABLE I
BASELINE ACCURACY
Dataset CIFAR-10
Network topology VGG-9
ANN accuracy 89.5%
SNN-Ia accuracy 85.6%
SNN-IIb accuracy 87.1%
aANN-to-SNN conversion. bSpike-based backpropagation..
is worth-mentioning that each of the convolutional, sub-
sampling and fully connected layers are followed by LIF
neurons (ReLU activations) in SNN (ANN) architecture. We
have also used a dropout of 0.2 after each convolution and
fully-connected layer.
B. ANN Training
The first step of our experiment consists of training the
ANN models (network topology described in the previous
section), as showed in Fig. 1. Training of VGG-9 ANN is
performed with 200 epochs at an initial learning rate of 0.09,
which is reduced by a factor of 10 at the 81st and the 122nd
epoch (also known as learning rate annealing) in order to
ensure gradual decrease of the loss function during the training
process. Our custom simulation framework is implemented
based on PyTorch deep learning library [16].
C. SNN Training
In order to train the spiking VGG-9 model by following the
conversion method [12] (SNN-I), we have adjusted layer-by-
layer neuronal threshold values (theory in sec III-A) with the
maximum membrane potential at the corresponding input, by
running the forward propagation sequentially for each layer.
We have used a total of 2000 time steps for the entire forward
propagation, since it demands a sizable time-window to find
the optimum threshold values.
On the other hand, in case of the spike-based
backpropagation training of SNN (SNN-II), total number of
time steps is 70 during the forward propagation. The training
is performed with 125 epochs, where the learning rate is
reduced at the 70th and the 100th epoch. The details of the
training theory can be found in sec. III-B and Ref. [15]. The
baseline accuracy of the ANN and the trained SNNs are
summarized in table I.
D. Adversarial input generation: ANN-crafted
After the completion of the training phase, adversarial inputs
are generated from the trained models using four different
methods: (i) Non-targeted FGSM, (ii) Non-targeted R-FGSM,
(iii) Non-targeted I-FGSM and (iv) Targeted I-FGSM. The
flowchart in Fig. 1 elaborately describes the FGSM method
of adversary generation. According to (1), we have calculated
the sign matrix from the input gradient and multiplied with
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Fig. 1. A schematic summarizing the training, adversarial input generation and testing methods used in our work for both Artificial and Spiking Neural
Networks (ANN and SNN). Training: ANNs are trained according to the standard backpropagation formula, while two different techniques have been followed
for training SNNs: ANN-to-SNN conversion [12], [13] and direct-spike based backpropagation [14], [15]. The generated SNNs are referred as SNN-I and
SNN-II, respectively. Adversarial input generation: The flowchart inside the dotted red box, labelled as ANNAdv, refers to the Fast Gradient Sign Method
(FGSM) [4]. According to this method, adversarial input for MANN is produced from the clean input perturbed by the sign of the gradient of the loss
function with respect to the input (∇XJ).  is the amount of perturbation. In case of generating adversary from SNNs, first, we have created a transformed
ANN (MTANN ) by loading the weights (or scaled weights, in case of SNN-I) of the trained SNNs into a randomly initialized ANN. Next, rate-encoded
input Xrate is passed through the ANNAdv method, with MTANN . Dotted green box is used to represent SNN-crafted adversary generation method,
labelled as SNNAdv. We have trained two separate networks with the same architecture but different initializations for each of ANN, SNN-I and SNN-II
(denoted as MANN , MANNx for ANN; MSNN−I , MSNN−Ix for SNN-I and MSNN−II , MSNN−IIx for SNN-II). When MANN is used as both
the target and source model, the generated adversarial input is labelled as XANNadv,WB , where the superscript WB stands for Whitebox. On the other
hand, adversarial inputs crafted from MANNx (for attacking the target MANN ) are called XANNadv,BB (BB for Blackbox). Same labelling strategy is
used for SNN adversary generation. Testing: The target models used for test purpose are MANN , MSNN−I and MSNN−II . We have performed four
different comparisons between ANN and SNN adversarial attacks. Whitebox: ANN and SNN (both SNN-I and SNN-II) models are attacked by adversarial
inputs crafted from the same model as the target. SNN-I-crafted (SNN-II-crafted) Blackbox: ANN and SNN models are tested with a common adversary:
SNN-I-crafted (SNN-II-crafted) blackbox samples XSNN−Iadv,BB (XSNN−IIadv,BB). ANN-crafted Blackbox: ANN and SNN models are tested with a
common set of adversary: ANN-crafted blackbox samples XANNadv,BB . Note, red inputs are used to indiacte ANN-crafted samples, while the green ones
are SNN-crafted. The results of these four comparisons are presented in the four columns in Fig. 2.
perturbation . Since we normalized the image dataset to
represent zero mean, the absolute values of the input pixel
intensity in clean images range from 0 to 1. Hence, the amount
of perturbation inflicted upon the pixels needs to be normalized
too. We have used  = 8/255, 16/255, 32/255 and 64/255 (in
some cases) in our experiment. In the Iterative FGSM, we have
experimented with two-step, five-step and seven-step iterative
methods in order to investigate the effect of the number of
iteration steps. Note that we have used a random class as yll
in (7) for Targeted I-FGSM. All of the parameters used in (1)
- (7) have been summarized in table II.
TABLE II
ADVERSARIAL ATTACK: PARAMETERS
Attack type Perturbation,  no. of steps, k α
FGSM 8/255, 16/255, 32/255 1 -
R-FGSM 8/255, 16/255, 32/255 2 /2
I-FGSM 8/255, 16/255, 32/255 2, 5, 7 /k
Algorithm 1: ANN-crafted input: ANNAdv(X , NN , )
Input: Clean dataset X , True label Ytrue, Trained ANN
model NN with parameter set θ, forward
propagation fNN , adversarial perturbation 
Output: Adversarial dataset Xadv
1 for minibatch Xi in
{
X1, ..., Xm
}
do
2 forward:Output Y = fNN (X; θ)
3 Loss:L(Y, Ytrue) Backward:∇θL
4 Adversarial data:Xiadv = Xi + × sign(∇XiL)
5 end
E. Adversarial input generation: SNN-crafted
For a comprehensive analysis and comparison, we have de-
vised a method to generate attack samples from SNNs as well.
Algorithm 1 describes the widely-known FGSM in the context
of ANN. Algorithm 2 illustrates its proposed SNN counterpart.
FGSM calculates the gradient of the loss function with respect
to the clean input data. Due to the non-trivial operations during
gradient calculation in a spike-based model, we have come
up with a simple framework. Initially, an ANN model, NN ′
with the same network topology is randomly initialized. The
SNN model is independently trained (MSNN ). Subsequently,
NN ′ weight matrices are mapped and overwritten with the
learned weights of MSNN . Next, rate-based input, Xrate is
generated from the Poisson spike train of the clean dataset.
Afterwards, Xrate and NN ′ model are used to generate FGSM
adversarial input following Algorithm 1. This method has been
Algorithm 2: SNN-crafted input: SNNAdv(X , SNN , )
Input: Clean dataset X , True label Ytrue, Trained SNN
model SNN with parameter set θ, forward
propagation fSNN , adversarial perturbation 
Output: Adversarial dataset Xadv
1 Random initialization of an equivalent ANN model
NN ′(θ, fNN ′)
2 Modification of NN ′ weights, WNN ′ =WtrainedSNN
3 for minibatch Xi in
{
X1, ..., Xm
}
do
4 for each timestep t in total time T do
5 Poisson Spike Train: Xti
6 end
7 Rate input:Xirate =
∑
tXt
i
T
8 Adversarial
data:Xiadv = ANNAdv(Xirate, NN ′, )
9 end
schematically illustrated in Fig. 1. Note, for SNN-I, the scaling
factors of the weights of the transformed ANN, MTANN (Fig.
1) equal the threshold-scaling factors used in the ANN-to-SNN
conversion mechanism during training.
F. Testing
The last stage of our experiment consists of testing ANN,
SNN-I and SNN-II with different types of adversarial inputs.
The adversarial inputs are passed through the forward function
of the networks and compared against the true labels to
compute the corresponding adversarial test accuracy and loss.
We have performed four different sets of comparisons, as
described in the ”Testing” section in Fig. 1. We have trained
two separate networks with the same architecture, but different
initialization for each of ANN, SNN-I and SNN-II. They
are labelled as MANN , MANNx ; MSNN−I , MSNN−Ix and
MSNN−II , MSNN−IIx .
1) Whitebox: In this scenario, each of the target models
(MANN , MSNN−I and MSNN−II ) is attacked by the
adversarial input generated from their respective target
network.
2) SNN-I-crafted Blackbox: In this set of comparison, all
of the target models are attacked by inputs crafted from
a single SNN-I model MSNN−Ix .
3) SNN-II-crafted Blackbox: In this case, all of the target
models are attacked by inputs crafted from a single
SNN-II model MSNN−IIx .
4) ANN-crafted Blackbox: Here the common source model
for all three targets (MANN , MSNN−I , MSNN−II ) is
MANNx .
The target and source models for these comparisons are
summarized in table III.
V. RESULTS
A. ANN versus SNN adversarial robustness
First, we compared the ANN and SNN behavior under
whitebox scenario (column 1 of Fig. 2), where each target
network is attacked by adversarial inputs created using the
target’s parameters (ANN is attacked by ANN-crafted, SNN-I
by SNN-I crafted and so on). It is evident from column 1 in
Fig. 2 that ANN faces smaller degradation in accuracy com-
pared to SNN-I and SNN-II against different kinds of whitebox
attacks (Non-targeted FGSM, R-FGSM, I-FGSM scenarios)
for varying  ranges. For instance, in FGSM whitebox attack
(Fig. 2(a) column 1), when  = 8/255, O1 (ANN loss), O2
(SNN-I loss) and O3 (SNN-II loss) correspond to 27.8%,
43.5% and 35.5%, respectively. However, we observed that
with a targeted attack (specifically, targeted I-FGSM shown
in Fig. 2 (d) Column 1), SNN-I and SNN-II losses are lower
than ANN.
Next, we compared the robustness of the models against
blackbox attacks. It is worth mentioning that ANN and SNN
models differ in terms of network dynamics and adversarial
input generation mechanism. Hence, to have a fair comparison
in blackbox scenario, we used a common source model (sepa-
rately trained and different from the target model) to generate
TABLE III
ADVERSARIAL ATTACK COMPARISONS: ANN, SNN-I AND SNN-II
ANN SNN-I SNN-II
Target Source Target Source Target Source
Whitebox MANN MANN MSNN−I MSNN−I MSNN−II MSNN−II
SNN-I-crafted Blackbox MANN MSNN−Ix MSNN−I MSNN−Ix MSNN−II MSNN−Ix
SNN-II-crafted Blackbox MANN MSNN−IIx MSNN−I MSNN−IIx MSNN−II MSNN−IIx
ANN-crafted Blackbox MANN MANNx MSNN−I MANNx MSNN−II MANNx
SNN-I-crafted Blackbox SNN-II-crafted Blackbox
ANN (O1) SNN-I  (O2) SNN-II (O3)
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Fig. 2. A comparison of the loss in accuracy under adversarial attack of ANN (blue bar, O1), SNN-I (Grey bar, O2) and SNN-II (Black bar, O3) for
four different types of attacks: (a) Non-targeted FGSM, (b) Non-targeted R-FGSM, (c) Non-targeted I-FGSM (2-step) and (d) Targeted I-FGSM (2-step). In
each of these cases, the amount of perturbation  has been varied from 8/255 to 32/255. Column 1 presents whitebox attack results. Columns 2-4 present
blackbox attack results, wherein the networks are attacked by a common set of adversarial inputs (SNN-I crafted blackbox adversary for column 2, SNN-II
crafted blackbox adversary for column 3 and ANN-crafted blackbox adversary for column 4). Note, the method detailed earlier in Fig. 1 is used to generate
SNN-crafted adversary from SNN-I and SNN-II. The loss for each network is calculated as the difference between the baseline accuracy (clean input test) and
test accuracy (adversarial input test). Smaller loss in accuracy implies more adversarial robustness. Minimum loss values are highlighted with red rectangles
in each subplot.
the adversaries and subsequently, attacked ANN, SNN-I and SNN-II with it, as illustrated in Fig. 2. The source model used
to generate adversarial example is SNN-I, SNN-II and ANN in
column 2, 3 and 4, respectively. Interestingly, in contrary to the
whitebox results, we observe that SNNs turn out to be more
robust in blackbox setting. Even for the ANN-crafted blackbox
attack case (column 4), where all three networks yield smaller
accuracy degradation, SNNs show lower loss than ANN. This
points to the fact that spike-based computing with temporal
dynamics has some intrinsic resistance, compared to standard
rate-based ANN dynamics. We conjecture that the stochas-
ticity in the temporal dynamics that is inherited with spike
computing might be contributing to this adversarial resistance.
Another noteworthy observation here is that the accuracy loss
observed with SNN-I/-II-crafted blackbox attacks across all
the models is significantly higher than ANN-crafted blackbox
attacks. This implies that adversarial inputs generated with
temporal spike-based SNNs cast stronger attacks than rate-
based ANNs. Revisiting the whitebox attack results, we can
surmise that the stronger attack created from SNN models is
the cause of higher accuracy degradation for spiking models
in that case.
In summary, we can deduce the following from the above
results with regard to ANN vs. SNN adversarial effects: 1)
SNNs cast stronger adversarial attacks than ANNs, leading to
more accuracy loss for SNN, compared to ANN, in whitebox
scenario. 2) SNNs are more robust in blackbox setting than
ANNs due to the inherent stochastic temporal dynamics.
B. Dependence on SNN training method: SNN-I versus SNN-II
Now, we analyse the dependence of the training mechanism
(used to create the SNN) on its adversarial resistance. In
order to obtain a clearer picture, we compared the adversarial
resistance of SNN-I (ANN-to-SNN conversion) and SNN-II
(direct spike based training) against different kinds of attacks,
described as follows (Fig. 3):
• Whitebox (WB): Here, SNN-I (SNN-II) is attacked by
adversarial input produced from the same SNN-I (SNN-
II), respectively. During this WB attacks in Fig. 3 (a)-(d),
SNN-I undergoes more loss compared to SNN-II for all
types of attacks (except Targeted I-FGSM).
• SNN-I-crafted Blackbox (BB1): Here, the source model
for adversary generation is a separately trained SNN-I
(different from the target SNN-I). This common adversary
is used to attack both SNN-I and SNN-II. For all types
of adversaries, SNN-II exhibits significant robustness
compared to SNN-I.
• SNN-II-crafted Blackbox (BB2): The common set of
adversary, in this case, is obtained from a separately
trained SNN-II. Previously, for BB1 (SNN-I-crafted at-
tack), we observed that the accuracy loss of SNN-I was
significantly higher than SNN-II. Hence, in this case, one
might expect that SNN-II target models will yield very
high accuracy loss compared to SNN-I targets (since the
attack is crafted from SNN-II). However, the amount of
accuracy degradation for SNN-II is still comparable to
that of SNN-I. This suggests that networks trained with
spike-based training have more adversarial resistance that
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Fig. 3. A comparison of SNN-I and SNN-II loss for four types of adversarial
inputs: (a) Non-targeted FGSM, (b) Non-targeted R-FGSM, (c) Non-targeted
I-FGSM (2-step) and (d) Targeted I-FGSM (2-step) at  = 16/255. Each
subplot contains comparison results under whitebox (WB: SNN-I is attacked
by SNN-I-crafted, SNN-II is attacked by SNN-II-crafted input), SNN-I-crafted
blackbox (BB1: both SNN-I and SNN-II are attacked by a separately trained
SNN-I), SNN-II-crafted blackbox (BB2: both SNN-I and SNN-II are attacked
by a separately trained SNN-II) and ANN-crafted-blackbox (BB3: both SNN-I
and SNN-II are attacked by ANN-crafted input) scenario.
conversion-based models. We speculate that the determin-
istic nature of conversion based models (converting ReLU
values to IF functionality) does not entirely inherit the
stochasticity in temporal dynamics causing adversarial
susceptibility for SNN-I models.
• ANN-crafted Blackbox (BB3): In this scenario, the com-
mon adversarial source model is an ANN. Here the loss
values for SNN-I and SNN-II lies within a range of 1%
for all attack types and are much lower than the BB1,
BB2 scenarios. This further corroborates the fact that
SNNs craft stronger attacks than ANNs.
Note, Fig. 3 basically contains the adversarial test results for
SNN-I and SNN-II presented in the previous figure (Fig. 2) at
a fixed  value ( = 16/255).
C. Dependence on I-FGSM iteration steps for SNN-II
In order to investigate the effect of the number of it-
eration steps used in I-FGSM on SNN, we have plotted
the loss of SNN-II for Non-targeted and Targeted I-FGSM
attacks with two-step (black), five-step (blue) and seven-step
(red) iterative methods in Fig. 4(a) and (b). Note, itera-
tive attacks are stronger than single-step attacks (such as,
FGSM or R-FGSM). I-FGSM input for the target model
(MSNN−II ) has been created from three different source net-
works: MSNN−II (whitebox: solid lines), MSNN−IIx (SNN-
II-crafted-blackbox: dashed lines) and MANNx (ANN-crafted
blackbox: dotted lines). We note that the step-number variation
has little effect on the performance of the models in all cases.
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Fig. 4. Comparison of the loss in SNN-II under I-FGSM (a) Non-targeted
and (b) Targeted attacks for number of steps = 2, 5, 7, when perturbation 
is varied from 8/255 to 64/255. In each plot, solid, dashed and dotted lines
indicate attack by SNN-II-crafted whitebox input, SNN-II-crafted blackbox
input and ANN-crafted blackbox input, respectively. The magnitude of loss
is mostly independent of the number of steps used in I-FGSM and yields
minimum value when the network is attacked by ANN-crafted input for all
cases.
In addition, as observed earlier, SNN-crafted blackbox inputs
cause stronger attacks compared to ANN-crafted blackbox. To
analyse this further, we compared the slope of the lines in
Targeted I-FGSM attack (Fig. 4(b)). Amount of loss rises from
6% to only 22% for ANN-crafted blackbox, as we increase 
(the amount of adversary) from 8/255 to 64/255, whereas loss
due to SNN-crafted blackbox attack (dashed line) undergoes
a staggering increase from 6% to 50%. This establishes the
effectiveness of SNN-based adversaries for casting stronger
attacks.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we analyzed the role of bio-plausible Spiking
Neural Networks in the domain of adversarial attacks. As
an initial work in this field, we have addressed some unex-
plored issues like introducing simplified method for crafting
adversarial sample from spiking networks and dependence of
robustness on SNN training mechanism. In addition, our quan-
titative comparison for variety of adversarial attacks presents
a comprehensive picture of the performance of these networks
under different attack scenarios. Finally, the key findings and
recommendations from our analysis are:
• SNNs craft stronger attack than ANNs in both whitebox
and blackbox setting.
• While SNNs undergo higher accuracy degradation than
ANNs in whitebox scenarios, they yield significantly
higher resistance than ANNs for blackbox attacks. The
temporal dynamics and inherent stochasticity in SNNs
might be responsible for such behavior. Further work is
required to understand the role of temporal dynamics for
adversarial resistance.
• SNNs trained with spike based backpropagation are more
robust than SNNs obtained from conversion rules against
both whitebox and blackbox attacks. This further ascer-
tains the role of stochasticity (preserved in the spike-
based backpropagation mechanism) to strengthen adver-
sarial resistance.
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